

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----108376 301302Z /72
P 301240Z JUN 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1515
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 09929

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 29, 1978
(SALT TWO-1799)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JUNE 29, 1978

- I

AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE
USSR AND THE U.S. IS THE PROTOCOL THERETO.

THE PROTOCOL CONTAINS PROVISIONS CONCERNING
IMPORTANT MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THESE ARE: THE OBLIGATION NOT
TO DEPLOY MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST
ICBMS FROM SUCH LAUNCHERS; THE OBLIGATION NOT TO FLIGHT-
TEST OR DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN
EXCESS OF 2,500 KILOMETERS, AND ALSO NOT TO DEPLOY CRUISE

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MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS ON
SEA-BASED LAUNCHERS OR LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS; THE OBLIGA-
TION NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST OR DEPLOY ASBMS. THE TEXTS OF
THE ARTICLES OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH CONTAIN THE AFORE-
MENTIONED OBLIGATIONS, HAVE BEEN AGREED. THE QUESTION OF
NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, THE SUBJECT OF ARTICLE II
OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL, IS UNDER DISCUSSION.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE PROTOCOL THERETO ARE MEANT TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE PROTOCOL WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE. TO ESTABLISH A THREE-YEAR TERM RATHER THAN SOME TRUNCATED TERM FOR THE PROTOCOL WOULD MEET THE TASK OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT. AND, CONVERSELY, TO CHANGE THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL BY SHORTENING IT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE, SINCE THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, WHICH IS THE DECLARED POLICY OF OUR TWO POWERS.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE THREE-YEAR TERM OF THE PROTOCOL PROVIDES THE NECESSARY TIME FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS OF THE QUESTIONS INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL.

PRECISELY SUCH AN APPROACH IS ALSO CONSISTENT
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WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN THE SIDES CONCERNING THE TERM OF THE PROTOCOL; THIS MUST BE APPROPRIATELY REFLECTED IN THE CONCLUDING PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL AND, CONSEQUENTLY, ALSO IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT BEING NEGOTIATED.

I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE PROTOCOL WILL ENTER INTO FORCE ON THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY AND WILL REMAIN IN FORCE FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS BEGINNING FROM THAT DATE UNLESS REPLACED EARLIER BY AN AGREEMENT ON FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

- II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

NOW ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE DOCUMENTS BEING PREPARED SHOWS WHICH ISSUES OF THE JOINT STATEMENT HAVE BEEN AGREED AND WHERE BRACKETS STILL REMAIN.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE DRAFT TREATY, TO THE EFFECT THAT PROMPTLY AFTER THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE BEGUN WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AGREEMENT ON FURTHER MEASURES

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----108442 301310Z /72

P 301240Z JUN 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1516
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 09929

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FOR THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF ENSURING CONTINUITY AND CONSISTENCY OF THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE SIDES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS IS CONSISTENT NOT ONLY WITH THE VITAL INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO WITH THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL IN MOSCOW IN APRIL 1978, THE SIDES REACHED A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PART OF THE JOINT STATEMENT WHERE DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN BE AGREED IN BROAD AND GENERAL TERMS.

IT IS BASED ON THIS, AND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FURTHER PROGRESS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS

OF THE DRAFT, THAT ON MAY 17, 1978, THE USSR DELEGATION
TABLED NEW PROPOSALS FOR THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT
STATEMENT AND FOR CERTAIN OTHER PROVISIONS.

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ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, THE THIRD
SECTION WOULD RECORD THAT IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT
NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT
FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WILL SEEK
TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS, INCLUDING REDUCTION OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF
NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES, AND
THAT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THESE FACTORS, THE SIDES WILL
ALSO SEEK TO ACHIEVE QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES AND
SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND ON MODERNIZATION
OF EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS HELD IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS
THE EXISTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES IN
PRINCIPLE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT, WHILE
ESTABLISHING THE PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR
SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, AT THE SAME TIME MUST NOT
PREDETERMINE THE SPECIFIC RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS AT SALT
THREE, THE SOVIET PROPOSALS MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO REACH
FULL AGREEMENT ON THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATE-
MENT.

IT APPEARS THAT THE SIDES ARE OF ONE MIND THAT
THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE
A PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF
SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES
AND OBJECTIVES RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT, THE SIDES
WILL SEEK TO RESOLVE THE QUESTIONS INCLUDED IN THE
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON
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THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHILE THE
FOURTH SECTION SHOULD STIPULATE THAT IN THE COURSE OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS, EACH SIDE WILL BE FREE TO RAISE ANY
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS AGAIN THAT UNDERSTANDINGS ON MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST, OF COURSE, BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. IN VIEW OF THIS, THE BRACKETED WORDING IN THE SECOND SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF VERIFICATION BY MEASURES IN ADDITION TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, IS CONTRARY TO THE AFOREMENTIONED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE. THIS KIND OF CONTRADICTION CANNOT BE ALLOWED. MOREOVER, THE ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE SECOND SECTION CONTAIN ALL THAT IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT; AMONG OTHER THINGS THEY ALSO PROVIDE FOR TAKING, AS APPROPRIATE, COOPERATIVE MEASURES CONTRIBUTING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

MR. AMBASSADOR, MORE THAN TWO MONTHS HAVE NOW ELAPSED SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW; HOWEVER, WE HAVE SEEN NO RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE U.S. DELEGATION ON THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION. THIS CAUSES US TO WONDER ABOUT THE POLITICAL WILL TO MOVE TOWARD COMPLETING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE JOINT DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENTS. FOR IT IS OBVIOUS THAT PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN RESULT ONLY FROM THE MUTUAL EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES. EARLE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), SPEECHES, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA09929
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780270-0784
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t1978064/aaaaadfz.tel
Line Count: 248
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 6ea94685-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 feb 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2282803
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 29, 1978 (SALT TWO-1799) SEMENOV STATEMENT, JUNE 29, 1978
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, (SEMENOV, V S)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6ea94685-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014